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Abstract
Ethereum Research team has proposed a family of Casper blockchain consensus protocols for Ethereum 2.0.
It has been shown in the literature that Casper Friendly Finality Gadget (Casper FFG) for Ethereum 2.0’s beacon
network cannot achieve liveness property in partially synchronous networks such as the Internet environment. The
“Correct-by-Construction” family of Casper blockchain consensus protocols (CBC Casper) has been proposed as a
finality gadget for the future release of Ethereum 2.0 blockchain. Unfortunately, neither constructive finality rule nor
satisfactory liveness property has been obtained for CBC Casper, and it is commonly believed that CBC Casper could
not achieve liveness property in asynchronous networks. This paper provides the first probabilistic CBC Casper pro-
tocol that achieves liveness property against t = ⌊n−1
3
⌋ Byzantine participants in complete asynchronous networks.
The seminal work by Fisher, Lynch, and Paterson (FLP) shows that there does not exist a deterministic BFT proto-
col in complete asynchronous networks against a single failure. Existing BFT protocols for complete asynchronous
networks are all probabilistic which are based either on individual coin-flipping or on common coin-flipping. This
paper proposes the first secure and deterministic leaderless blockchain BFT protocol XP against t = ⌊n−1
3
⌋ Byzan-
tine participants in complete asynchronous networks. This result does not contradict with FLP’s impossibility results
since XP leverages the total order properties of candidate blocks in blockchains (similar properties may not hold for
general BFT application scenarios).
1 Introduction
Consensus is hard to achieve in open networks such as partial synchronous networks or complete asynchronous net-
works. Several practical protocols such as Paxos [10] and Raft [13] have been designed to tolerate ⌊n−12 ⌋ non-
Byzantine faults. For example, Google, Microsoft, IBM, and Amazon have used Paxos in their storage or cluster
management systems. Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [11] and Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [14] initiated the study
of reaching consensus in face of Byzantine failures and designed the first synchronous solution for Byzantine agree-
ment. For asynchronous networks, Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [8] showed that there is no deterministic protocol
for the BFT problem in face of a single failure. Several researchers have tried to design BFT consensus protocols to
circumvent the impossibility. The first category of efforts is to use a probabilistic approach to design BFT consensus
protocols in completely asynchronous networks. This kind of work was initiated by Ben-Or [2] and Rabin [15] and
extended by others such as Cachin, Kursawe, and Shoup [5]. It should be noted that though probabilistic approach
was used to design BFT protocols in asynchronous networks, some researchers used probabilistic approach to design
BFT protocols for complete synchronous networks also. For example, the probabilistic approach based BFT protocols
[7, 12] employed in ALGORAND blockchain [9] assumes a synchronous and complete point-to-point network. The
second category of efforts was to design BFT consensus protocols in partial synchronous networks which was initiated
by Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer [6].
Ethereum foundation has tried to design a BFT finality gadget for their Proof of Stake (PoS) based Ethereum 2.0
blockchain. It has been shown in Wang [17] that their currently deployed Casper Friendly Finality Gadget (Casper
FFG) [4] for Ethereum 2.0 beacon network does not achieve liveness property in partially synchronous networks.
Ethereum foundation has been advocating the “Correct-by-Construction” (CBC) family of Casper blockchain con-
sensus protocols [18, 19] for their future release of Ethereum 2.0 blockchain. The CBC Casper the Friendly Ghost
emphasizes the safety property. But it does not try to address the liveness requirement for the consensus process.
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Indeed, it explicitly says that [18] “liveness considerations are considered largely out of scope, and should be treated
in future work”. Thus in order for CBC Casper to be deployable, a lot of work needs to be done since the Byzantine
Agreement Problem becomes challenging only when both safety and liveness properties are required to be satisfied at
the same time. It is simple to design BFT protocols that only satisfy one of the two requirements (safety or liveness).
The Ethereum foundation community has made several efforts to design safety oracles for CBC Casper to help partic-
ipants to make a decision when an agreement is reached (see, e.g., [16]). However, this problem is at least as hard as
coNP-complete problems. So no satisfactory solution has been proposed yet.
CBC Casper has received several critiques from the community. For example, Ali et al [1] concluded that “the defi-
nitions and proofs provided in [19] result in neither a theoretically sound nor practically useful treatment of Byzantine
fault-tolerance. We believe that considering correctness without liveness is a fundamentally wrong approach. Impor-
tantly, it remains unclear if the definition of the Casper protocol family provides any meaningful safety guarantees
for blockchains”. Though CBC Casper is not a deployable solution yet and it has several fundamental issues yet to
be addressed, we think these critiques as in [1] may not be fair enough. Indeed, CBC Casper provides an interesting
framework for consensus protocol design. In particular, the algebraic approach proposed by CBC Casper has certain
advantages for describing Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols. The analysis in this paper shows that the current
formulation of CBC Casper could not achieve liveness property. However, if one revises the CBC Casper’s algebraic
approach to include the concept of “waiting” and to enhance participant’s capability to identify more malicious ac-
tivities (that is, to consider general malicious activities in addition to equivocating activities), then one can design
efficiently constructive liveness concepts for CBC Casper even in complete asynchronous networks.
As we have mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [8] showed that there does not
exist a deterministic BFT protocol against a single failure in complete asynchronous networks. All existing BFT pro-
tocols for asynchronous networks in the literature are non-deterministic and are based on participant’s autonomous
coin-flipping or participants’ shared common coin-flipping. In this paper, we show that it is possible to design an effi-
cient deterministic leaderless BFT protocol XP for the blockchain applications. The protocol XP circumvents Fischer,
Lynch, and Paterson’s impossibility results by leveraging certain special properties for blockchain applications. This
kind of blockchain properties do not hold for general BFT application scenarios considered by Fischer, Lynch, and
Paterson.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3 provides a brief review of the CBC Casper framework. The
author of [18] mentioned in several talks that CBC Casper does not guarantee liveness in asynchronous networks.
Section 4 presents a protocol which shows that revised CBC Casper can indeed provide liveness property in asyn-
chronous networks. Section 5 presents an efficient deterministic BFT protocol XP as a finality gadget for blockchains
in complete asynchronous networks.
2 System model and Byzantine agreement
In this section, we describe our basic system model. For the Byzantine general problem, there are n participants and
an adversary that is allowed to corrupt up to t of them. The adversary model is a static one wherein the adversary
must decide whom to corrupt at the start of the protocol execution. For the network setting, we assume a complete
asynchronous network of Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [8]. That is, we make no assumptions about the relative speeds
of processes or about the delay time in delivering a message. We also assume that processes do not have access
to synchronized clocks, so algorithms based on time-outs cannot be used. We also assume that the adversary has
complete control of the network: he may schedule/reorder the delivery of messages as he wishes, and may drop or
insert messages as he wishes. However, we assume that all messages are eventually delivered if the sender makes
infinitely many trials to send the messages. The honest participants are completely passive: they simply follow the
protocol steps and maintain their internal state between protocol steps.
The computations made by the honest participants and the adversary are modeled as polynomial-time computa-
tions. We assume that public key cryptography is used for message authentications. In particular, each participant
should have authentic public keys of all other participants. This means that if two participants Pi and Pj are honest
and Pj receives a message from Pi over the network, then this message must have been generated by Pi at some prior
point in time. A Byzantine agreement protocol must satisfy the following properties:
• Safety: If an honest participant decides on a value, then all other honest participants decides on the same value.
That is, it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to make two honest participants to decide on different
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values.
• Liveness (termination): There exists a function B(·) such that all honest participants should decide on a value
after the protocol runs at most B(n) steps. It should be noted that B(n) could be exponential in n. In this
case, we should further assume that 2n is significantly smaller than 2κ where κ is the security parameter for the
underlying authentication scheme. In other words, one should not be able to break the underlying authentication
scheme within O(B(n)) steps.
• Non-triviality (Validity): If all honest participants start the protocol with the same initial value, then all honest
participants that decide must decide on this value.
3 CBC Casper the Friendly Binary Consensus (FBC)
CBC Casper has binary version and integer version. In this paper, we only consider Casper the Friendly Binary Con-
sensus (FBC). Our discussion can be easily extended to general cases. For the Casper FBC protocol, each participant
repeatedly sends and receives messages to/from other participants. Based on the received messages, a participant can
infer whether a consensus has been achieved. Assume that there are n participants P1, · · · , Pn and let t < n be the
Byzantine-fault-tolerance threshold. The protocol proceeds from step to step (starting from step 0) until a consensus
is reached. Specifically the step s proceeds as follows:
• LetMi,s be the collection of valid messages that Pi has received from all participants (including himself) from
steps 0, · · · , s− 1. Pi determines whether a consensus has been achieved. If a consensus has not been achieved
yet, Pi sends the message
mi,s = 〈Pi, ei,s,Mi,s〉 (1)
to all participants where ei,s is Pi’s estimated consensus value based on the received message setMi,s.
In the following, we describe how a participant Pi determines whether a consensus has been achieved and how a
participant Pi calculates the value ei,s fromMi,s.
For a message m = 〈Pi, ei,s,Mi,s〉, let J(m) = Mi,s. For two messages m1,m2, we write m1 ≺ m2 if m2
depends onm1. That is, there is a sequence of messagesm
′
1, · · · ,m′v such that
m1 ∈ J(m′1)
m′1 ∈ J(m′2)
· · ·
m′v ∈ J(m2)
For a message m and a message set M = {m1, · · · ,mv}, we say that m ≺ M if m ∈ M or m ≺ mj for some
j = 1, · · · , v. The latest message m = L(Pi,M) by a participant Pi in a message set M is a message m ≺ M
satisfying the following condition:
• There does not exist another messagem′ ≺M sent by participant Pi withm ≺ m′.
It should be noted that the “latest message” concept is well defined for a participant Pi if Pi has not equivocated,
where a participant Pi equivocates if Pi has sent two messages m1 6= m2 with the properties that “m1 6≺ m2 and
m2 6≺ m1”.
For a binary value b ∈ {0, 1} and a message setM, the score of a binary estimate for b is defined as the number
of non-equivocating participants Pi whose latest message voted for b. That is,
score(b,M) =
∑
L(Pi,M)=(Pi,b,∗)
λ(Pi,M) (2)
where
λ(Pi,M) =
{
0 if Pi equivocates inM,
1 otherwise.
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To estimate consensus value: Now we are ready to define Pi’s estimated consensus value ei,s based on the received
message setMi,s as follows:
ei,s =


0 if score(0,Mi,s) > score(1,Mi,s)
1 if score(1,Mi,s) > score(0,Mi,s)
b otherwise, where b is coin-flip output
(3)
To infer consensus achievement: For a protocol execution, it is required that for all i, s, the number of equivocating
participants in Mi,s is at most t. A participant Pi determines that a consensus has been achieved at step s with the
received message setMi,s if there exists b ∈ {0, 1} such that
∀s′ > s : score(b,Mi,s′) > score(1− b,Mi,s′). (4)
4 Liveness of Revised CBC Casper FBC
From CBC Casper protocol description, it is clear that CBC Casper is guaranteed to be correct against equivocating
participants. However, the “inference rule for consensus achievement” requires a mathematical proof that is based on
infinitely many message setsMi,s′ for s′ > s. This requires each participant to verify that for each potential set of t
Byzantine participants, their malicious activities will not overturn the inequality in (4). This problem is at least co-NP
hard. Thus even if the system reaches a consensus, the participants may not realize this fact. In order to address this
challenge, Ethereum community provides three “safety oracles” (see [16]) to help participants to determine whether
a consensus is obtained. The first “adversary oracle” simulates some protocol execution to see whether the current
estimate will change under some Byzantine attacks. As mentioned previously, this kind of problem is co-NP hard and
the simulation cannot be exhaustive generally. The second “clique oracle” searches for the biggest clique of participant
graph to see whether there exist more than 50% participants who agree on current estimate and all acknowledge the
agreement. That is, for each message, the oracle checks to see if, and for how long, participants have seen each other
agreeing on the value of that message. This kind of problem is equivalent to the complete bipartite graph problem
which is NP-complete. The third “Turan oracle” uses Turan’s Theorem to find the minimum size of a clique that
must exist in the participant edge graph. In a summary, currently there is no satisfactory approach for CBC Casper
participants to determine whether finality has achieved. Thus no liveness is guaranteed for CBC Casper. Indeed, we
can show that it is impossible to achieve liveness in CBC Casper.
4.1 Impossibility of achieving liveness in CBC Casper
In this section, we use a simple example to show that without a protocol revision, no liveness could be achieved in
CBC Casper. Assume that there are 3t + 1 participants. Among these participants, t − 1 of them are malicious and
never vote. Furthermore, assume that t + 1 of them hold value 0 and t + 1 of them hold value 1. Since the message
delivery system is controlled by the adversary, the adversary can let the first t+ 1 participants to receive t+ 1 voted 0
and t voted 1. On the other hand, the adversary can let the next t+ 1 participants to receive t+ 1 voted 1 and t voted
0. That is, at the end of this step, we still have that t + 1 of them hold value 0 and t + 1 of them hold value 1. This
process can continue forever and never stop.
In CBC Casper FBC [18, 19], a participant is identified as malicious only if he equivocates. This is not sufficient
to guarantee liveness (or even safety) of the protocol. For example, if no participant equivocates and no participant
follows the equation (3) for consensus value estimation, then the protocol may never make a decision (that is, the
protocol cannot achieve liveness property). However, the protocol execution satisfies the valid protocol execution
condition of [18, 19] since there is zero equivocating participant.
4.2 Revising CBC Casper FBC
CBC Casper does not have an in-protocol fault tolerance threshold and does not have any timing assumptions. Thus
the protocol works well in complete asynchronous settings. Furthermore, it does not specify when a participant Pi
should broadcast his step s protocol message to other participants. That is, it does not specify when Pi should stop
waiting for more messages to be includedMi,s. We believe that CBC Casper authors do not specify the time for a
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participant to send its step s protocol messages because they try to avoid any timing assumptions. In fact, there is a
simple algebraic approach to specify this without timing assumptions. First, we revise the message set Mi,s as the
collection of messages that Pi receives from all participants (including himself) during step s−1. That is, the message
setMi,s is a subset of Es where Es is defined recursively as follows:
E0 = ∅
E1 = {〈Pj , b, ∅〉 : j = 1, · · · , n; b = 0, 1}
E2 = {〈Pj , b,Mj,1〉 : j = 1, · · · , n; b = 0, 1;Mj,1 ⊂ E1}
· · ·
Es = {〈Pj , b,Mj,s−1〉 : j = 1, · · · , n; b = 0, 1;Mj,s−1 ⊂ Es−1}
· · ·
Then we need to revise the latest message definition L(Pj ,Mi,s) accordingly:
L(Pj ,Mi,s) =
{
m if 〈Pj , b,m〉 ∈ Mi,s
∅ otherwise (5)
As we have mentioned in the preceding section, CBC Casper FBC [18, 19] only considers equivocating as malicious
activities. This is not sufficient to guarantee protocol liveness against Byzantine faults. In our following revised CBC
Casper model, we consider any participant that does not follow the protocol as malicious and exclude their messages:
• For a message setMi,s, let I(Mi,s) be the set of identified malicious participants fromMi,s. Specifically, let
I(Mi,s) = E(Mi,s) ∪ F (Mi,s)
where E(Mi,s) is the set of equivocating participants withinMi,s and F (Mi,s) is the set of participants that
does not follow the protocols withinMi,s. For example, F (Mi,s) includes participants that do not follow the
consensus value estimation process properly or do not wait for enoughmessages before posting his own protocol
messages.
With the definition of I(Mi,s), we should also redefine the score function (2) by revising the definition of λ(Pi,M)
accordingly:
λ(Pi,M) =
{
0 if Pi ∈ I(M),
1 otherwise.
4.3 Secure BFT protocol in the revised CBC Casper
With the revised CBC Casper, we are ready to introduce the “waiting” concept and specify when a participant Pi
should send his step s protocol message:
• A participant Pi should wait for at least n− t+ |I(Mi,s)| valid messagesmj,s−1 from other participants before
he can broadcast his step s messagemi,s. That is, Pi should wait until |Mi,s|≥ n− t+ |I(Mi,s)| to broadcast
his step s protocol message.
• In case that a participant Pi receives n− t+ |I(Mi,s)| valid messagesmj,s−1 from other participants (that is,
he is ready to send step s protocol message) before he could post his step s − 1 message, he should wait until
he finishes sending his step s− 1 message.
• After a participant Pi posts his step s protocol message, it should discard all messages from steps s− 1 or early
except decision messages that we will describe later.
It is clear that these specifications does not have any restriction on the timings. Thus the protocol works in complete
asynchronous networks.
In Ben-Or’s BFT protocol [2], if consensus is not achieved yet, the participants autonomously toss a coin until
more than n+t2 participant outcomes coincide. For Ben-Or’s maximal Byzantine fault tolerance threshold t ≤ ⌊n5 ⌋, it
takes exponential steps of coin-flipping to converge. It is noted that, for t = O(
√
n), Ben-Or’s protocol takes constant
rounds to converge. Bracha [3] improved Ben-Or’s protocol to defeat t < n3 Byzantine faults. Bracha first designed
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a reliable broadcast protocol with the following properties (Bracha’s reliable broadcast protocol is briefly reviewed
in the Appendix): If an honest participant broadcasts a message, then all honest participants will receive the same
message in the end. If a dishonest participants Pi broadcasts a message, then either all honest participants accept
the identical message or no honest participant accepts any value from Pi. By using the reliable broadcast primitive
and other validation primitives, Byzantine participants are transformed to fail-stop participants in Bracha [3]. In this
section, we assume that a reliable broadcast primitive such as the one by Bracha’s is used in our protocol execution.
In the following, we adapt Bracha’s BFT protocol to the CBC Casper framework. At the start of the protocol, each
participant Pi holds an initial value in his variable xi ∈ {0, 1}. The protocol proceeds from step to step. The step s
consists of the following sub-steps.
1. Each participant Pi reliably broadcasts 〈Pi, xi,Mi,s,0〉 to all participants whereMi,s,0 is the message set that
Pi has received during step s− 1. Then Pi waits until it receives n− t valid messages inMi,s,1 and computes
the estimate ei,s using the value estimation function (3).
2. Each participant Pi reliably broadcasts 〈Pi, ei,s,Mi,s,1〉 to all participants and waits until it receives n− t valid
messages inMi,s,2. If there is a b such that score(b,Mi,s,2) > n2 , then let e′i,s = b otherwise, let e′i,s =⊥.
3. Each participant Pi reliably broadcasts 〈Pi, e′i,s,Mi,s,2〉 to all participants and waits until it receives n− t valid
messages inMi,s,3. Pi distinguishes the following three cases:
• If score(b,Mi,s,2) > 2t + 1 for some b ∈ {0, 1}, then Pi decides on b and broadcasts his decision
together with justification to all participants.
• If score(b,Mi,s,2) > t+ 1 for some b ∈ {0, 1}, then Pi lets xi = b and moves to step s+ 1.
• Otherwise, Pi flips a coin and let xi to be coin-flip outcome. Pi moves to step s+ 1.
Assume that n = 3t+ 1. The security of the above protocol can be proved be establishing a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 4.1 If all honest participants hold the same initial value b at the start of the protocol, then every participant
decides on b at the end of step s = 0.
Proof. At sub-step 1, each honest participant receives at least t+1 value b among the 2t+1 received values. Thus all
honest participants broadcast b at sub-step 2. If a malicious participant Pj broadcasts 1 − b during sub-step 2, then it
cannot be justified since Pj could not receive t+ 1 messages for 1− b during sub-step 1. Thus Pj will be included in
I(M). That is, each honest participant receives 2t+ 1 messages for b at the end of sub-step 2 and broadcasts b during
sub-step 3. Based on the same argument, all honest participants decide on b at the end of sub-step 3. ✷
Lemma 4.2 If an honest participant Pi decides on a value b at the end of step s, then all honest participants either
decide on b at the end of step s or at the end of step s+ 1.
Proof. If an honest participant Pi decides on a value b at the end of sub-step 3, then Pi receives 2t+ 1 valid messages
for the value b. Since the underlying broadcast protocol is reliable, each honest participant receives at least t+1 these
valid messages for the value b. Thus if a participant Pi does not decide on the value b at the end of sub-step 3, it would
set xi = b. That is, all honest participants will decide during step s+ 1. ✷
The above two Lemmas show that the protocol is a secure Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol against ⌊n−13 ⌋
Byzantine faults in complete asynchronous networks. The above BFT protocol may take exponentially many steps to
converge. However, if a common coin such as the one in Rabin [15] is used, then the above protocol converges in
constant steps. It should be noted that Ethereum 2.0 provides a random beacon which could be used as the common
coin for the above BFT protocol. Thus the above BFT protocol could be implemented with constant steps on Ethereum
2.0.
5 Deterministic leaderless BFT protocol in asynchronous networks
BFT consensus protocols could be used differently for various blockchains. For many Proof of Stake (PoS) based
blockchains, BFT consensus protocol is used as a finality gadget. That is, there is an underlying block production
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mechanism. BFT protocol is used to finalize these blocks. For this kind of applications, one may design deterministic
BFT protocols in complete asynchronous networks. It is noted that after Fisher, Lynch, and Paterson (FLP) proved
that there is no deterministic protocols in complete asynchronous networks, several probabilistic BFT protocols (e.g.,
Rabin’s BFT and Ben-Or’s BFT) have been designed. Non-deterministic BFT protocols are not practical since they
generally require exponentially many steps if autonomous coin-flips are used. Even with a shared common coin
implementation, non-deterministic BFT protocols are not yet efficient due to the complexity of common coin imple-
mentation. On the other hand, BFT protocols for partially synchronous networks generally require round leaders to
coordinate the protocol process. When round leader’s identity is revealed (this is normally true), a malicious adversary
could easily launch a Denial of Service attack against the round leader to prevent the protocol from proceeding. Thus
it is preferred to design efficient leaderless BFT protocols in partial synchronous or complete asynchronous networks.
As we have mentioned, there does not exist a deterministic BFT protocol in complete asynchronous networks and
existing non-deterministic leaderless BFT protocols are not efficient. It seems to be an impossible task to design an
efficient leaderless BFT protocol. Fortunately for blockchain applications, we can leverage blockchain properties to
design efficient deterministic leaderless BFT finality gadget for blockchains. Our result does not contradict with Fisher,
Lynch, and Paterson’s (FLP) impossibility results due to the following reasons: in FLP’s scenario with n = 3t+ 1, if
at least 2t+1 participants hold the same value at the start of the protocol and all of these 2t+1 participants are honest,
then all honest participants should decide on this value at the end of the protocol (some other honest participant may
hold a different value at the start of the protocol though). However, for a blockchain scenario with n = 3t+ 1, if 3t
participants hold the same value at the start of the protocol and one participant Pi holds a different value at the start
of the protocol, we may still prefer that all honest participants decide on Pi’s value at the end of the protocol if Pi’s
block is the best candidate. In other words, even if the best candidate block is held only by the adversary at the start of
the protocol, the protocol may still decide on this best candidate block.
5.1 A toy example of PoS blockchain
We use a toy example for PoS blockchain to illustrate the application scenario. The initial status of the block chain is
S0 = {(P1, a1), · · · , (Pj , aj)}
where P1, P2, · · · , Pj are a list of initial users and a1, · · · , aj are their respective initial amounts of money units. We
assume that each user Pi is identified by its public key pki. That is, for the users P1, P2, · · · , Pj , their corresponding
public keys are pk1, · · · , pkj . In practical implementations, a user Pi may be identified by the hash of her public key.
That is, we may use Pi = H(pki) in implementations. A valid transaction from a user Pi to a user Pi′ is in the format
of
SIGpki(Pi, Pi′ , a
′)
where the user Pi currently has a ≥ a′ money units, Pi′ is an existing or a newly created user, and pki is the public
key of user Pi. The impact of this transaction is that the amount of money units for user Pi is decreased by a
′ and the
amount of money units for user Pi′ is increased by a
′.
In an idealized magic ledger system, all transactions are valid and the list L of sets of transactions are posted in a
tamper-proof box in the sky which is visible to all participants
L = TX0, TX1, TX2, · · · .
A Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain is organized in a series of heights h = 0, 1, 2, 3, · · ·. Similar to the initial status,
the system status for height h > 0 is a list of users and their corresponding money units
Sh =
{
(P1, a
(h)
1 ), (P2, a
(h)
2 ), (P3, a
(h)
3 ), · · ·
}
In a height h, the system status transitions from Sh to Sh+1 via the transaction set TXh
TXh : Sh → Sh+1.
A PoS blockchain is a list of blocks B0, B1, · · · , Bh where each Bh consists of the following fields: the block
number h itself, the time-stamp th that the block Bh is generated, the set TX
h of transactions for height h, the hash
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of the previous blockH(Bh−1), the user P h who generates this block, and a set CERT h of signatures certifying that
the block Bh is constructed appropriately
Bh =
{
h, th, TX
h, H(Bh−1), P h, CERT h
}
.
The field CERT h is a valid list of signatures for the value H
(
h, th, TX
h, H(Bh−1), P h)
)
from qualified verifier
committee V h for height h. From this chain, one can deduce the user sets U0, U1, · · · , Uh−1 and their corresponding
money units of each height.
In a PoS blockchain, the block proposer P h for the height h obtains certain benefits (e.g., P h may be awarded
with certain amount of cryptographic currency or obtain the transaction fees). A commonly employed technique is
to use a probabilistic approach to determine the block proposer P h. For example, for each user Pi who has si stakes
in the system, one can calculate a random number wi = F (si, Ri, R
h) < 1 using a commonly agreed function F (·)
where Ri could be the random number committed by Pi and R
h could be a shared random beacon for the height h of
the blockchain. Then user Pi0 is the proposer for the height h of the blockchain if
wi0 = min
i
{wi : wi = F (si, Ri, Rh)}.
To avoid potential attacks, the random number Ri is kept secret until the proposer Pi = P
h publishes her pro-
posed candidate block Bhi . The challenging problem is: how can a participant Pi determines that her value wi
is the smallest without learning the values wj for other participants Pj? In practice, the system has a pre-agreed
constant wh for each block height h. Each participant Pi with her value wi < w
h proposes a candidate block
Bhi =
{
h, th, TX
h
i , H(B
h−1), Pi
}
. After all potential proposers for height h publish their candidate blocks Bhi , an
independent verifier committee carries out a BFT protocol to decide the finalized block Bh for height h from these
candidate blocks. For the convenience of protocol design, we order these candidate blocks using potential proposer’s
value wi. That is, let B
h
i ≺ Bhj if one of the following conditions holds
• wj < wi.
• wi = wj andH(B
h
j ) < H(B
h
i ) for a fixed hash functionH(·).
It should be noted that a potential proposer should not propose two different candidate blocks. Otherwise, all of
candidate blocks proposed by this potential leader is considered as invalid. That is, a candidate block Bj1 is invalid
if there exists j2 6= j1 such that both blocks Bj1 and Bj2 are proposed by a same proposer. Assume that all valid
candidate blocks for the height h are ordered as
Bh1 ≺ Bh2 ≺ · · · ≺ Bhτ .
The verifier committee, consisting of participants P1, · · · , Pn, needs to select one of these candidate blocks as the
finalized block for height h. Due to network latency (e.g., network asynchrony) or other challenges, a participant may
only receive a subset of these candidate blocks. If a BFT participant identifies a candidate block as invalid, it will
remove it from its local list and include the proof (that this block is invalid) in all his future messages. Each participant
prefers the “largest” valid block that he is aware of to be finalized (though the finalized block may be different from
the largest one).
5.2 Deterministic blockchain BFT protocols for asynchronous networks
As we have mentioned in the beginning of this section, all existing leaderless BFT protocols in asynchronous networks
are non-deterministic and use coin-flipping (either a shared common coin or autonomous coins) to reach agreement.
By the FLP theorem, it is impossible to design deterministic (without coin-flipping) BFT protocols in asynchronous
networks. However, the BFT finality gadget for blockchain has slightly different requirement. Assume that the can-
didate blocks for height h are ordered as: Bh1 ≺ Bh2 ≺ · · · ≺ Bhτ . The verifier committee consists of participants
P1, · · · , Pn where n = 3t + 1. As a special illustrative case, assume that participants P1, · · · , Pn−1 are only aware
of the candidate block Bh1 and the participant Pn is aware of the candidate block B
h
2 . This could happen due to net-
work asynchrony where the candidate block Bh2 only reached the participant Pn. For the traditional BFT protocol,
the verifier committee should finalize the candidate block Bh1 as the finalized block. However, for blockchain finality
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gadget, it is acceptable for the verifier committee to finalize the candidate block Bh2 as the finalized block. Since there
is a total order on valid candidate blocks and it is preferred to finalize the largest valid candidate block as the finalized
block, one can circumvent FLP’s impossibility result and design efficient deterministic (no coin-flipping) leaderless
BFT protocols in complete asynchronous networks.
In the following, we present a leaderless deterministic BFT protocol XP for complete asynchronous networks. In
the BFT protocol XP, when a participant cannot make a decision during one step, he sets his local variable to the
largest candidate block that he is aware of. This is contrast to the approaches in probabilistic BFT protocols wherein
a participant flips a coin when a decision is not made. The protocol XP tolerates n−13 Byzantine participants. Our
protocol is motivated by the probabilistic BFT protocol in Cachin, Kursawe, and Shoup [5] (CKS). Specifically, we
employ the message “justification” approach in CKS. It should be noted that the message justification approach is
similar to Ethereum’s CBC approach where message history is included in each message for “justification” purpose.
In our following protocol, we do not assume that there is a reliable broadcast protocol (compare the BFT protocol in
Section 4.3 where a reliable broadcast primitive is required). Since broadcast may not be reliable, a malicious partic-
ipant may send different messages to different participants. Message justification is used to attack these challenges
due to unreliable broadcast channel. At the start of the protocol, each participant Pi holds one or zero candidate block
in its local variable xi. Then protocol proceeds from step to step. The step s ≥ 0 for a participant Pi consists of the
following sub-steps:
• lock: If s = 0, then let B = xi. Otherwise, if s > 0, select n− t valid commit-votes from step s− 1 and let
B =
{
B′ Pi receives a commit-vote for B
′ in step s− 1
xi otherwise
(6)
Then Pi sends the following message to all participants.
〈Pi, lock, s, B, justification〉 (7)
where justification consists of a list of messages to show that his selection of the value B is justified.
• commit: Pi collects n− t valid and justified step-s lock messages (7). If there is any candidate block B′ from
these lock messages such that xi ≺ B′, then Pi lets xi = B′. Furthermore, Pi lets
B¯ =
{
B if there are n− t locks for B
⊥ otherwise (8)
Then Pi sends the following message to all participants
〈Pi, commit, s, B¯, xi, justification〉 (9)
where justification consists of a list of messages to show that his selection of the value B¯ is justified.
• check-for-decision: Collect n − t properly justified commit votes (9) of step s. If there is any commit vote
〈Pj , commit, s, ∗, xj, justification〉 with xi ≺ xj , then Pi lets xi = xj . Furthermore, if these are n − t
commit-votes for a block B¯, then Pi decides the block B¯ and continues for one more step (up to commit
sub-step). Otherwise, simply proceed.
Assume that n = 3t+ 1. The security of the above protocol can be proved be establishing a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 5.1 If all honest participants hold the largest block Bτ at the start of the protocol, then every participant
decides on this value at the end of step s = 0.
Proof. This is straightforward. ✷
Lemma 5.2 If an honest participant Pi decides on the value B¯ at the end of step s, then all honest participants either
decide on B¯ at the end of step s or at the end of step s+ 1.
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Proof. If an honest participant Pi decides on the value B¯ at the end of step s, then at least t + 1 honest participants
commit-vote for B¯. Thus each participant (including malicious participant) receives at least one commit-vote for B¯ at
the end of step s. This means that a malicious participant cannot create a justification that she has received a commit-
vote for another block B 6= B¯ or has received 2t+ 1 commit-votes for⊥ during step s. In other words, if a malicious
participant broadcasts a lock message for a blockB 6= B¯ during step s+1, it cannot be justified and will be discarded
by honest participants. That is, all honest participants will commit-vote for the block B¯ during step s + 1 and any
commit-vote for other blocks by malicious participants cannot be justified. That is, all honest participants will receive
n− t justified commit-vote for the block B¯ and will decide on block B¯ at the end of step s+ 1. ✷
Lemma 5.3 The value B in equation (6) is well defined.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that each participantPi (including both honest and dishonest participants) can not receive
commit-votes for two different blocks B¯1 and B¯2 during step s. For a contradiction, assume that Pi receives commit-
vote for both B¯1 and B¯2 during step s. Then there are n − t participants submit lock messages for B¯1 and n − t
participants submit lock messages for B¯2. This means that at least one honest participant submits lock messages
for both B¯1 and B¯2 which is impossible. ✷
Lemma 5.4 All honest participant decides in constant steps.
Proof. If no participant decides at step s, then there must exist an honest participant Pi that revises its local variable
to a new candidate block which is larger than its previous candidate block. Since there are at most τ candidate blocks,
this process continues until no honest participant revises its local variable xi. Then all honest participants hold the
same candidate block and the consensus will be reached. ✷
The above four Lemmas show that the protocol XP is a secure Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol against ⌊n−13 ⌋
Byzantine faults in complete asynchronous networks. Assuming that at least one honest participant holds the largest
candidate block, then the protocol XP converges in at most two steps in a complete synchronous network. Thus it
is more efficient compared against other non-deterministic BFT protocols (for complete asynchronous networks) and
deterministic leader-based BFT protocols (for partial synchronous networks).
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A Bracha’s broadcast primitive
Assume n > 3t. Bracha [3] designed a broadcast protocol for asynchronous networks with the following properties:
• If an honest participant broadcasts a message, then all honest participants accept the message.
• If a dishonest participant Pi broadcasts a message, then either all honest participants accept the same message
or no honest participant accepts any value from Pi.
Bracha’s broadcast primitive runs as follows:
1. The transmitter Pi sends the value 〈Pi, initial, v〉 to all participants.
2. If a participant Pj receives a value v with one of the following messages
• 〈Pi, initial, v〉
• n+t2 messages of the type 〈echo, Pi, v〉
• t+ 1 message of the type 〈ready, Pi, v〉
then Pj sends the message 〈echo, Pi, v〉 to all participants.
3. If a participant Pj receives a value v with one of the following messages
• n+t2 messages of the type 〈echo, Pi, v〉
• t+ 1 message of the type 〈ready, Pi, v〉
then Pj sends the message 〈ready, Pi, v〉 to all participants.
4. If a participant Pj receives 2t+ 1 messages of the type 〈ready, Pi, v〉, then Pj accepts the message v from Pi.
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Assume that n = 3t + 1. The intuition for the security of Bracha’s broadcast primitive is as follows. First, if an
honest participant Pi sends the value 〈Pi, initial, v〉, then all honest participant will receive this message and echo the
message v. Then all honest participants send the ready message for v and all honest participants accept the message v.
Secondly, if honest participants Pj1 and Pj2 send ready messages for u and v respectively, then we must have
u = v. This is due to the following fact. A participant Pj sends a 〈ready, Pj , u〉 message only if it receives t + 1
readymessages or 2t+1 echomessages. That is, there must be an honest participant who received 2t+1 echomessages
for u. Since an honest participant can only send one message of each type, this means that all honest participants will
only sends ready message for the value u.
In order for an honest participant Pj to accept a message u, it must receive 2t+ 1 ready messages. Among these
messages, at least t+1 ready messages are from honest participants. An honest participant can only send one message
of each type. Thus if honest participants Pj1 and Pj2 accept messages u and v respectively, then we must have u = v.
Furthermore, if a participant Pj accepts a message u, we just showed that at least t + 1 honest participants have sent
the ready message for u. In other words, all honest participants will receive and send at least t+ 1 ready message for
u. By the argument from the preceding paragraph, each honest participant sends one ready message for u. That is, all
honest participants will accept the message u.
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